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Legal Structure, Financial 
Structure, and the Monetary Policy 
Transmission Mechanism
Stephen G. Cecchetti
ver the past decade, the countries of central
Europe have become more alike in many
ways. As the new members of the European
Monetary Union (EMU) prepared for the
birth of the euro on January 1, 1999, their economic policies
became substantially more uniform. All eleven countries in
the new euro area have virtually eliminated inflation and
taken serious steps toward fiscal consolidation.1 As their
monetary and fiscal policies have adjusted to meet these
common goals, the countries’ business cycle fluctuations
appear to have become more synchronized as well.2 While
this makes the job of the Eurosystem (the European Central
Bank plus the central banks of the eleven monetary union
member countries) easier, numerous difficult challenges
remain. Primary among these is the making of policy in
the face of the possibility that it will have differential
impacts across the countries of the euro area. 
The task facing the Eurosystem is even more
complex than that facing countries with stable monetary
regimes, where the measurement of the national and
regional impact of policy has already proved to be extremely
difficult. The creation of the Eurosystem constitutes a
regime shift in virtually every sense of the term. The
introduction of the euro seems sure to prompt adjust-
ments in the economies of the member countries, and
these adjustments will probably alter the relationship
between the actions of the central bank and the real econ-
omy. That is, the monetary transmission mechanism of the
countries in the euro area will change, making the job of
the new European Central Bank even more difficult than
it is already. But how quickly will it change, and what
will it become? 
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To answer these questions, we must understand
the fundamental determinants of the impact of policy
actions on output and inflation. For insight into these
determinants, I turn to the modern views of the monetary
transmission mechanism, which assign a central role to
financial structure. Kashyap and Stein (1997) provide a
starting point; they focus on the importance of the banking
system and go on to emphasize the distributional effects of
monetary policy changes. The conventional wisdom has
always been that some industries are more sensitive to
interest rate changes than others, and so changes in
policy-controlled interest rates have differential effects
across industries. The view based on financial structure
both formalizes this reasoning and takes it one step further
by noting that some firms are more dependent on banks for
financing than others, and that this is true both across and
within industries. According to this “lending view” of the
transmission mechanism, monetary policy actions change
the reserves available to the banking system, thereby affect-
ing the willingness of banks to lend and, ultimately, the
supply of loans. How this mechanism will affect individual
firms depends on the financing methods available to them.
Monetary policy has a bigger impact on firms that are
reliant on banks for their financing. Furthermore, healthier
banks will be able to adjust to the policy-induced reserve
changes more easily than other banks will. 
The distributional effects implied by the lending
view of monetary policy transmission have clear implica-
tions for the euro area and the Eurosystem. Countries in
which firms are more bank dependent and banking systems
are less healthy will be more sensitive to the Eurosystem’s
decisions to change interest rates. This brings me to the
first question I will address in this paper: Is there evidence
that the impact of monetary policy innovations varies
across countries with the strength and scope of the banking
system? 
With this in mind, I examine differences in the
size, concentration, and health of national banking systems,
as well as in the availability of nonbank sources of finance.
I find, consistent with the most casual observation, that
banking system characteristics vary dramatically across the
countries of the European Union (EU). Furthermore, these
differences do seem to be related to estimated differences in
the impact of interest rate changes on output and inflation.
Countries with many small banks, less healthy banking
systems, and poorer direct capital access display a greater
sensitivity to policy changes than do countries with big,
healthy banks and deep, well-developed capital markets. 
 But this is just the first question. The more
important issue facing the Eurosystem is whether the
national banking systems, and the implied sensitivity of
each country’s real economy to monetary policy shocks,
will change now that there is monetary union. 
 It is easy to assert that European banks will soon
look like U.S. banks, exhibiting a financial structure and
transmission mechanism similar to the American models.
After all, the euro area does resemble the United States, at
least superficially. It has a slightly larger population—
292 million for the eleven members of the monetary union
relative to 270 million for the United States—and nearly
as high a level of GDP—$6.8 trillion compared with
$8.1 trillion in 1997. The euro area also has a similar
degree of openness to trade, with imports accounting for
slightly more than 10 percent of GDP. These parallels,
along with the fact that financial technology is easily trans-
ferable across national boundaries, have led a number of
observers to conclude that the introduction of the euro may
act as a catalyst, speeding the rate at which financial rela-
tionships in Europe become like those in the United States.
For example, while Dornbusch, Favero, and Giavazzi
(1998, pp. 48-9) do note the possibility for EU-wide
asymmetries resulting from differences in financial
structure, they assert that “the euro will change the way
financial markets work, inducing corresponding changes
in the monetary mechanism. In addition to pervasive
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deregulation already under way and innovation, the intro-
duction of the euro will revolutionize the financial struc-
ture of Europe. Europe will in a short period become more
nearly like the USA.” McCauley and White (1997, p. 17)
suggest that there may be an acceleration in the rate at
which securities replace loans on the asset side of bank bal-
ance sheets and commercial paper replaces deposits on the
liability side. They point to a “dramatic potential for assets
to be stripped out of the banking system” and for securities
markets to absorb as much as one-third of the corporate
loans now originated in European banks.3 Overall, these
commentators are speculating that the increased liquidity
of European financial markets brought about by monetary
union will lead to significant consolidation of banks, with
mergers at both the national and the international level, as
well as a direct substitution of traded equities and bonds
for bank loans. 
Why should we believe that the European finan-
cial structure will quickly be transformed into one that
mirrors the one in the U.S. model? Without an explanation
for the evolution of these countries’ national financial
structures that is based on their existing differences, such
claims are unconvincing. What accounts for the variation
in the financial intermediation systems across countries?
Traditionally, we look to taxes and regulation for an expla-
nation, and Dornbusch, Favero, and Giavazzi (1998) as
well as White (1998) do mention these. Danthine, Giavazzi,
Vives, and von Thadden (1999) identify a number of barri-
ers to change in national financial structure and note the
importance of the historical path that has brought each
country’s banks to their current state. Danthine et al.
then go on to assert that “legal differences between EU
states, in particular the lack of some form of ‘European
corporate law,’ also remain important and constitute an
additional factor of market segmentation” (p. 45). Such
disparities in legal structure can explain important
economic patterns, and they can be maintained for long
periods of time, significantly delaying the harmonization
of national banking systems.4
It is my main contention that the differences in
financial structure across the countries of Europe are a con-
sequence of their dissimilar legal structures. My argument
draws on the work of La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer,
and Vishny (1997, 1998), who focus on the relationship
between legal structures and finance. They argue that the
structure of finance in a country depends on the rights
accorded shareholders and creditors by the laws of that
country, as well as on the degree to which these laws are
enforced. The nature of the laws is, in turn, a product of
the legal tradition on which the civil codes of a country are
based. La Porta et al. establish that the character of a
country’s financial markets depends on the country’s legal
structure. Putting their arguments together with the lend-
ing view of the monetary transmission mechanism leads to
the possibility that it is the legal system in a country that
forms the basis for the structure of financial intermediation
and, hence, for the impact of monetary policy on output
and prices. 
Table 1 reports the empirical findings that support
the basic conclusion of the paper. After classifying coun-
tries by the origin, or “family,” of their legal structure, I
calculate for each family the average level of an index of
monetary policy’s likely effectiveness (based on banking
system size, concentration, and health, with a higher value
implying greater effectiveness) and the estimated impact of
an interest rate change on output and inflation (from a
small-scale structural model). The results suggest that a
country’s legal structure, financial structure, and monetary
transmission mechanism are interconnected. The clear
pattern is that the predicted effectiveness and its measured
impact vary systematically based on the origin of a
country’s legal system. Countries with better legal pro-
tection for shareholders and debtors (countries with a legal
It is my main contention that the differences 
in financial structure across the countries of 
Europe are a consequence of their dissimilar 
legal structures.12 FRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / JULY 1999
structure based on English common law) have financial
structures in which the lending channel of monetary trans-
mission is expected to be less potent; for these countries,
the measured impact of an interest rate change on output
and inflation is lower.
The implication is that unless the laws governing
shareholder and creditor rights and the enforcement of those
laws are harmonized across the members of the European
Monetary Union, monetary policy will continue to have a
differential impact. Put slightly differently, it is my belief
that the financial structures in the countries of the euro area
will not converge into one large U.S.-style system unless
there are dramatic legislative changes. If such legal har-
monization occurs—that is, if the civil codes protecting
shareholders and creditors are made uniform across the
countries that have entered the monetary union—then the
regional variation in the impact of interest rate changes on
output and inflation should decrease.5 But if legal conver-
gence does not occur, financial structure will remain hetero-
geneous, and so will the monetary transmission mechanism,
and the job of the Eurosystem will be to construct appropri-
ate policy that takes these asymmetries into account.6 
The remainder of this paper provides the building
blocks for this argument. In the next section, I provide a
brief survey of the theories of the monetary transmission
mechanism, focusing on the importance of financial struc-
ture to an understanding of monetary transmission. The
following section assesses the national banking systems,
including measures of overall size, concentration, health,
and the relative importance of nonbank finance. Overall,
this analysis allows me to evaluate the likely strength of
the lending channel across countries. Subsequently, I report
estimates, for a set of ten countries, of the impact of an
interest rate increase on output and inflation. These esti-
mates follow the pattern that is expected: Countries where
financial structure data suggest that the lending channel
should be strong exhibit more sensitivity to monetary
policy movements. Following the discussion of these
findings, I present the data and arguments from La Porta
et al. (1997, 1998) on the relationship between legal and
financial structures. This allows me to test the prediction
that countries with poor shareholder and creditor protec-
tions and poor law enforcement will have less developed
financial systems and greater sensitivity of output and
inflation to interest rate changes. While far from being
definitive, the results are consistent with my main hypoth-
esis: Differences in legal systems give rise to variations in
national financial structures, and these variations in turn
lead to divergences in monetary transmission mechanisms.
So long as the legal systems of the euro area countries
remain distinct, the impact of interest rate changes
across these countries will differ.
THEORIES OF THE TRANSMISSION 
MECHANISM 
A number of comprehensive surveys of the theories of the
monetary transmission mechanism have appeared in recent
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Table 1
EFFECTIVENESS OF POLICY AND THE ORIGINS
OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM
Index of Effectiveness Impact of Policy
Legal Family of Monetary Policy On Output On Inflation
English 1.1 -0.45 -0.21
Scandinavian 1.8 -0.52 -0.22
French 2.1 -0.70 -0.20
German 2.4 -1.25 -0.49
Notes:  The index of effectiveness of monetary policy, from Table 5, is based on 
financial structure variables described in the text under the heading “Likely 
Strength of the Transmission Mechanism,” with higher values implying a larger 
expected impact of interest rate changes on output and prices. The impact of 
policy on output and inflation, from Table 6, is a measure of the maximum 
response, in percentage points, to an interest rate movement of 100 basis points, 
estimated using a small-scale structural model. Countries are classified by the 
origin, or family, of their legal structure, and group means are reported based on 
data for Ireland, the United Kingdom, and the United States (English common 
law); Denmark and Sweden (Scandinavian common law); Belgium, France, Italy, 
Portugal, and Spain (French civil law); and Germany (German civil law).FRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / JULY 1999 13
years. These include Bernanke (1993), Gertler and Gilchrist
(1993), Kashyap and Stein (1994, 1997), Hubbard (1995),
and my own survey, Cecchetti (1995). As a result, I will
be brief. 
 All theories of how interest rate changes affect the
real economy have a common starting point. A monetary
policy action begins with a change in the level of bank
reserves. For this to have any real effects at all, there must
be nominal rigidities in the economy. Otherwise, a change
in the nominal quantity of outside money cannot have any
impact on the real interest rate. While the ability of the
central bank to change the level of bank reserves is not in
question, the source of the nominal rigidity that allows the
change in reserves to alter short-run real rates of return has
been under debate for decades. The current state of this dis-
cussion is well summarized by Christiano, Eichenbaum,
and Evans (1997). They distinguish three sets of theories:
one set based on sticky wages, a second set based on sticky
prices, and a third set built on the idea of limited partici-
pation. The sticky wage and sticky price models, which are
the most familiar, rest on the idea that there are costs to
nominal price and wage changes, and so adjustments are
infrequent. In limited participation models, introduced in
Rotemberg (1984), individuals (households) are unable to
adjust their cash balances sufficiently rapidly in response to
changes in the environment—that is, households have a
limited ability to participate in financial markets, and so
must commit themselves to certain portfolio holdings for
relatively long periods of time.7
The sources of nominal rigidities are relatively
unimportant for the discussion of the mechanism by which
interest rate changes have short-run effects on output and
prices, and so I will move directly to a discussion of the
current theories of the transmission mechanism.8 Our
current views are based on the work of Bernanke (1983),
Bernanke and Blinder (1992), and Bernanke and Gertler
(1989, 1990). These authors distinguish between the tradi-
tional money view, in which interest rate movements affect
the level of investment and exchange rates directly, and the
lending view, in which financial intermediaries play a promi-
nent role in transmitting monetary impulses to output and
prices. I will describe each of these views in turn. 
The traditional view, which is largely the founda-
tion for the textbook IS-LM model, is based on the notion
that reductions in the quantity of outside money raise real
rates of return. This outcome has two effects, the first
directly from interest rates to investment and the second
through exchange rates. An interest rate increase reduces
investment, as there are fewer profitable projects available
at higher required rates of return. A policy action induces a
movement along a fixed marginal-efficiency-of-investment
schedule. This interest rate channel will be more powerful
the less substitutable outside money is for other assets. The
exchange rate channel is also familiar from textbook models.
Here, an interest rate increase results in a real appreciation
of the domestic currency, reducing the foreign demand for
domestically produced goods. Regardless of whether the
transmission mechanism occurs through the interest rate
channel or the exchange rate channel, there is no real need
to discuss banks. In fact, there is no reason to distinguish
any of the “other” assets in investors’ portfolios. This is a
simple two-asset model. 
An important implication of this traditional model
of the transmission mechanism concerns the incidence of
the investment decline. Since there are no externalities or
market imperfections, only the least socially productive
projects, those with the lowest rates of return, go un-
funded. As a result, the capital stock is marginally lower,
but, given that a decline is going to occur, the allocation of
the decline across sectors is socially efficient. 
 As most of the surveys cited earlier emphasize, the
lending view has two parts, one that focuses on the impact
of policy changes on borrower balance sheets and another
that focuses on bank loans. In both, the effectiveness of
policy depends on capital market imperfections that make
it easier for some firms to obtain financing than others.
Information asymmetries and moral hazard problems,
together with bankruptcy laws, mean that the state of a
firm’s balance sheet has implications for its ability to
obtain external finance.9 By reducing expected future sales
and by increasing the cost of rolling over a given level of
nominal debt, policy-induced increases in interest rates
(which are both real and nominal) cause a deterioration in
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of information in that borrowers (firms) have better infor-
mation about the potential profitability of investment
projects than do creditors (banks). As a result, as the firm’s
net worth declines, the firm becomes less creditworthy
because it has an increased incentive to misrepresent the
riskiness of potential projects—an outcome that will lead
potential lenders to increase the risk premium they require
when making a loan. The asymmetry of information
makes internal finance of new investment projects cheaper
than external finance. 
 More important for the transmission mechanism
per se is that some firms are dependent on banks for finance
and that monetary policy affects bank loan supply. A
reduction in the quantity of reserves forces a reduction in
the level of deposits, which must be matched by a fall in
loans. Nevertheless, lower levels of bank loans will have an
impact on the real economy only insofar as there are firms
without an alternative source of investment funds. 
Substantial empirical evidence supports the im-
portance of both capital market imperfections and firm
dependence on bank financing. Kashyap and Stein (1997)
provide a summary of two types of studies. The first type
suggests that banks rely to a large extent on reservable-
deposit financing and that, for this reason, a contraction in
reserves will prompt banks to contract their balance sheets,
reducing the supply of loans. The second type establishes
that there are a significant number of bank-dependent
firms that are unable to mitigate the shortfall in bank lend-
ing with other sources of finance. Overall, recent research
does imply the existence of a lending channel.10
Models of monetary policy transmission based
on financial structure suggest a natural place to begin
looking for sources of cross-country differences in the
monetary transmission mechanism. The prediction is
that overall, the transmission mechanism will be stronger
in those countries where firms are more bank depen-
dent, and where the banking system is less healthy and
less concentrated. In the first instance, firms that have
less direct access to capital markets are unable to blunt
the effect of a contraction in bank loans. In the second,
banks themselves have restricted access to nonreservable
deposits and are forced to contract their balance sheets
by more for a given change in policy. In the next section
of the paper, I examine data on national financial struc-
ture and try to rank countries based on the likely
strength of the transmission mechanism. To the extent
that these cross-country differences are present, then the
lending view implies that they will persist until the
financial structures become more uniform.11
LIKELY STRENGTH OF THE TRANSMISSION 
MECHANISM
In assessing the likely impact of an interest rate change
on output and prices in the various countries of the EMU,
I follow the recent work of Kashyap and Stein (1997) and
assemble data on the size and concentration of the bank-
ing systems, along with measures of banking system
health, the importance of bank financing, and the size of
firms. The indicators are chosen to conform as closely as
possible to the economic quantities that the lending view
suggests should be important. The balance sheets of large,
healthy banks are not as sensitive to policy, because
reserve contractions can be readily offset with alternative
forms of finance that do not attract reserve requirements.
In addition, I examine measures of the development of
equity and debt markets in the EMU countries. Firms
with ready capital market access, which are more likely to
be found in countries with extensive secondary securities
markets, will be better insulated from bank loan-supply
contractions. Combining these measures, I construct an
index of the probable strength of the monetary transmis-
sion mechanism.12
Models of monetary policy transmission 
based on financial structure suggest a 
natural place to begin looking for sources 
of cross-country differences in the 
monetary transmission mechanism.FRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / JULY 1999 15
To assess the importance of small banks in a coun-
try’s financial system, Table 2 reports the number of banks,
the number of banks per million population, and measures
of concentration for all of the EU countries plus Japan and
the United States.13 The data reveal that Austria and
Finland have many more banks per capita—126 and 68
per million people, respectively—than any of the other
countries. The remaining countries fall into roughly three
groups: The United Kingdom, Japan, and the southern
European countries of Spain, Portugal, and Greece have
less than 10 banks per million; the United States and
Germany have 40 or slightly more; and the remaining
countries have between 13 and 25.
 Turning to the concentration measures in the
fourth column of the table, it is interesting to note that
countries with more banks do not necessarily have less
concentrated banking systems. France, for example, with
1,373 banks and just under 60 million people, has a fairly
high concentration ratio: the top five French banks account
for a sizable 40 percent of total banking system assets and
the top ten for nearly two-thirds. Overall, Denmark and
Germany have the least concentrated banking systems in
Europe. By contrast, large banks clearly dominate Sweden,
Finland, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Greece. The
remaining countries are somewhere in between.
 What do these findings imply for the strength of
the transmission mechanisms in the countries examined?
Austria, Germany, and the United States have systems
composed of a network of small banks, and so one would
expect the lending channel to be relatively strong in those
countries. At the other end of the spectrum, Belgium,
Finland, Ireland, the Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden, and
the United Kingdom all have banking industries domi-
nated by a small number of relatively large banks, with a
modest periphery of small institutions. The remaining
countries—Denmark, France, Greece, Italy, and Japan—
fall in a middle group.
The weaker a nation’s banking system, the
stronger the expected impact of policy movements. With
this in mind, I have collected a set of standard gauges of
banking system health—return on assets, loan loss provi-
sions, net interest margin, and operating costs—and I have
calculated a summary rating of overall system soundness
(Table 3). Focusing primarily on the return on assets and
the average Thomson ratings in Table 3 leads to the
following rankings: Ireland, the United Kingdom, and
the United States have the healthiest banks; Austria,
Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, Denmark,
and Greece are second; Finland, France, Italy, Portugal,
and Sweden are third; and Japan is alone at the bottom. 
Finally, I turn to the availability of nonbank
finance for firms in EU and other countries. The relevant
data are reported in Table 4. Following Kashyap and Stein
(1997) and La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny
(1997), I examine the number of publicly listed firms, the
extent of secondary equity and debt markets, and the ratio
of bank loans to all forms of finance. Although these are
crude measures of access to external finance, they are infor-
mative. As in the case of Table 2, the countries can be
divided into three groups. Austria, Ireland, Italy, Portugal,
and Greece appear to have the least well developed external
capital markets. They have small equity and bond markets,
Table 2
SIZE AND CONCENTRATION OF THE BANKING INDUSTRY,
BY COUNTRY, 1996
Country







Austria 1,019 126 48
Belgium 140 14 57
Finland 350 68 78
France 1,373 24 40
Germany 3,517 43 17
Ireland 62 18 41
Italy 937 16 25
Netherlands 172 11 79
Portugal 51 5 76
Spain 313 8 44
Members of the EU 
  not in EMU
Denmark 117 22 17
Greece 20 2 71
Sweden 124 14 90
United Kingdom 478 8 28
Other countries
 Japan 556 4 30
United States 10,803 40 17
Sources:  See the Data Appendix.
Note:  Concentration ratios are calculated as the percentage of each country’s 
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  Austria 0.38 0.59 1.67 2.45 2.38 (4)
  Belgium 0.52 0.17 1.41 1.67 2.00 (6)
  Finland 0.50 0.78 2.07 3.05 2.83 (3)
  France 0.36 0.24 1.43 1.84 2.28 (16)
  Germany 0.44 0.18 1.24 2.19 1.97 (19)
  Ireland 1.57 0.17 3.36 3.32 1.83 (3)
  Italy 0.33 0.62 2.32 3.19 2.57 (15)
  Netherlands 0.75 0.26 2.06 2.48 2.10 (5)
  Portugal 0.91 0.42 2.60 3.80 2.30 (5)
  Spain 0.76 0.32 2.20 2.69 1.79 (11)
Members of the EU not in EMU
  Denmark 0.91 0.11 1.28 0.97 2.33 (3)
  Greece 1.11 0.18 1.98 2.77 2.50 (6)
  Sweden 1.28 0.25 1.90 1.77 2.50 (5)
  United Kingdom 1.28 0.18 2.15 2.42 2.04 (23)
Other countries
  Japan 0.01 0.75 1.17 1.03 3.32 (44)
  United States 1.42 0.10 2.68 3.51 1.73 (344)
Sources:  See the Data Appendix.
Notes:  Except for the Thomson ratings, all figures in the table are calculated as a percentage of total bank assets. In column 5, the number of banks rated by Thomson in 
each country and used to compute the average appears in parentheses.
Table 4
IMPORTANCE OF EXTERNAL AND BANK FINANCE BY COUNTRY, 1996
Country
Number of Publicly 
Traded Firms
(1)
Publicly Traded Firms 
per Capita
(2)
Market Capitalization as a 
Percentage of GDP
(3)
Corporate Debt as a 
Percentage of GDP
 (4)
Bank Loans as a Percentage 
of All Forms of Finance
(5)
Monetary union members
  Austria 106 13.15 15 46 65
  Belgium 139 13.68 45 60 49
  Finland 71 13.87 50 34 39
  France 686 11.75 38 49 49
  Germany 681 8.32 29 58 55
  Ireland 76 21.59 18 13 80
  Italy 217 3.78 21 37 50
  Netherlands 217 13.97 96 48 53
  Portugal 158 16.11 23 19 62
  Spain 357 9.09 42 11 58
Members of the EU not in EMU
  Denmark 237 45.06 41 105 25
  Greece 245 23.44 20 3 48
  Sweden 229 25.90 99 73 32
  United Kingdom 2,433 41.39 150 45 37
Other countries
  Japan 2,334 18.56 67 39 59
  United States 8,479 31.94 111 64 21
Sources:  See the Data Appendix.
Notes:  Market capitalization is the year-end value of firms listed on major exchanges. For the United States, three exchanges are used; for Japan, eight; and for each of the 
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Table 5
SUMMARY OF FACTORS AFFECTING THE STRENGTH 












Country (1) (2) (3) (4)
Monetary union members
Austria 3 2 3 2.67
Belgium 1 2 1 1.33
Finland 1 3 2 2.00
France 2 3 2 2.33
Germany 3 2 2 2.33
Ireland 1 1 3 1.67
Italy 2 3 3 2.67
Netherlands 1 2 2 1.67
Portugal 1 3 3 2.33
Spain 2 2 2 2.00
Members of the EU 
  not in EMU
Denmark 2 2 1 1.67
Greece 2 2 3 2.33
Sweden 1 3 1 1.67
United Kingdom 1 1 1 1.00
Other countries
Japan 2 4 2 2.67
United States 3 1 1 1.67
Notes:  Column 1 is based on Table 2; column 2, on Table 3; and column 3, on 
Table 4.  Column 4 is an average of columns 1, 2, and 3.
and bank loans account for a high percentage of firm
financing. By contrast, Belgium, Denmark, Sweden, the
United Kingdom, and the United States all have substantial
secondary capital markets, and banks are a less important
source of finance. The remaining six countries are some-
where in between these two groups.
Table 5 summarizes the material in Tables 2-4 and
suggests the overall relative strength of monetary policy in
the fourteen EU countries, Japan, and the United States.
The final column, “Predicted Effectiveness of Monetary
Policy,” reports a measure of the effects of monetary policy
on output and inflation, where higher values suggest a
stronger lending channel and therefore a larger impact.
Overall, the pattern is very similar to the one reported in
Kashyap and Stein (1997, Table 6). Most important, the
predicted effects of interest rate movements vary greatly
across countries. For example, looking at the EMU coun-
tries, one would expect that a given interest rate change
would have the most impact in Austria and Italy, countries
in which small banks are relatively important, the banking
systems are less healthy, and firms have little access to non-
bank sources of finance. The opposite is true of Belgium,
Ireland, and the Netherlands, where the banking systems
are large and healthy and nonbank finance is readily avail-
able; in these countries, interest rate movements would be
expected to have a more muted impact.14
The conclusions of this section could be criticized
as applying only to the pre-EMU period. But will the
introduction of the euro be a catalyst for the harmonization
of financial structure across the EMU? I take this question
up in more detail later, but at this point I will simply
mention that the recent European Central Bank (1999)
report Possible Effects of EMU on the EU Banking Systems in
the Medium to Long Term provides very little evidence to
suggest that an increase in either international banking
competition or securitization and disintermediation will
occur quickly. 
MEASURING THE IMPACT OF POLICY 
ON OUTPUT AND PRICES
Testing the proposition that the banking system’s concen-
tration, health, and importance have a material impact on
the monetary transmission mechanism requires an estimate
of the effects of an interest rate change on output and
prices. Numerous studies report such estimates for some or
all of the countries of the EU. These include Gerlach and
Smets (1995), who estimate a three-variable structural vec-
tor autoregression based on long-run restrictions; de Bondt
(1997), who presents estimates of the impact of policy on
output and prices for Germany, France, Italy, the United
Kingdom, Belgium, and the Netherlands that are based on
the work of other authors; Dornbusch, Favero, and
Giavazzi (1998), who report estimates of the impact of
policy on output and prices derived from both small
vector-autoregressive models and large structural models,
for Italy, Germany, France, Spain, Sweden, and the United
Kingdom; Kieler and Saarenheimo (1998), who study
France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, concluding
that the transmission mechanism is not significantly differ-
ent across the three countries; and Vlaar and Schuberth18 FRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / JULY 1999
(1998), who examine money demand functions for fourteen
EU countries; Ehrmann (1998), who estimates structural
vector autoregressions for thirteen countries and finds con-
siderable differences in the intensity of the response of
output and prices to monetary shocks across countries;
and Cecchetti and Rich (1999), who look at a simple
two-variable system for Australia, Canada, France, Italy,
Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States,
and find large differences in the implied impacts.
Each of these studies has advantages and disadvan-
tages. Overall, I have chosen to examine the results
reported by Ehrmann (1998). The appeal of Ehrmann’s
approach is that it yields a series of estimates, all based on
the same methodology, for nearly the full set of EU coun-
tries. Ehrmann uses techniques devised by King, Plosser,
Stock, and Watson (1991). In effect, he identifies monetary
shocks using a combination of long-run and short-run
restrictions. The methods are described both in his paper
and in Cecchetti, McConnell, and Perez Quiros (1999). For
each country, the model has either four or five variables,
including output, inflation, and an interest rate, and—
with the exception of Germany—an exchange rate. When a
fifth variable is present, it is either a second interest rate or
a commodity price index.15
The chart plots the responses of output and infla-
tion to an interest rate movement of 100 basis points for
ten EU countries and the United States.16 These ten coun-
tries are the ones for which Ehrmann is able to generate
consistent and plausible results.17 As is clear from these
plots, the point estimates of the impulse response functions
vary dramatically across countries. Looking at the impact
of interest rate movements on output, note that for France
and Germany, the peak impact is nearly twice what it is in
the remaining European countries, and fifteen times the
estimated impact in the United States. The impact of
policy on inflation also varies substantially. 
Table 6 reports the maximum impact of a 100-
basis-point monetary contraction on output and inflation
for all of the countries for which I have estimates. I also
include a measure of the timing of the impact—the quarter
at which the maximum effect occurs. The final column in
the table presents a measure of the ratio of the average
output response to the average inflation response. This
measure is related to the sacrifice ratio because it is roughly
the output loss for an inflation decline of 1 percentage
point over a horizon of approximately three years. Unfortu-
nately, these estimates are not terribly precise, a point that
is clear from the results in Ehrmann’s paper,18 and so we
should not take some of the numbers too seriously.
SYSTEMATIC DIFFERENCES IN NATIONAL 
LEGAL SYSTEMS
If differences in financial systems are creating the cross-
sectional variation in the transmission mechanism, it is
natural to look for the causes of these differences. As noted
earlier, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny
(1997, 1998) have examined the relationship between a
country’s legal system and its financial system. The
premise of their work is that investors provide capital to
firms only if the investors have the ability to get their
money back. For equity holders, this means that they must
be able to vote out directors and managers who do not pay
them. For creditors, this means that they must have the
authority to repossess collateral. In addition to having
nominal legal rights, these groups must also have confi-
dence that the laws will be enforced.
 La Porta et al. (1997, 1998) collect data on the
legal systems in forty-nine countries. They show that all
of these legal systems belong to one of four families:
English common law, French civil law, Scandinavian civil
law, and German civil law. With regard to shareholder
rights—specifically, the ability of shareholders to vote
Testing the proposition that the banking system’s 
concentration, health, and importance have a 
material impact on the monetary transmission 
mechanism requires an estimate of the effects of 
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Reaction of Output and Inflation to an Interest Rate Increase of 100 Basis Points 
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directors out—English common law countries have the
best protections and French civil law countries have the
worst. The pattern is similar for creditor rights, which
entail the right to reorganize or liquidate a firm. The
pattern for enforcement is a bit different: Scandinavian  civil
law countries have the most rigorous law enforcement,
while French civil law countries have the most lax. 
Table 7 reproduces a portion of Table II from
La Porta et al. (1997). The column labeled “Shareholder
Rights” reports an index that is higher when shareholders
find it less costly and difficult to vote directors out. The
column labeled “Creditor Rights” reports an analogous
index that is lower when creditors experience less difficulty
gaining possession of property that has been used to collat-
eralize a bond or loan. Enforcement is an assessment of
countries’ rigor in carrying out their laws, with a higher
score implying more aggressive enforcement. Finally, the
table reports the legal family from which each country’s
laws are derived.
Table 6














  Austria — — — — —
  Belgium -0.72 2 -0.05 1 -45.29
  Finland — — — — —
  France -1.30 5 -0.21 2 -12.07
  Germany -1.21 5 -0.48 2 -5.83
  Ireland -0.76 4 -0.25 5 -3.45
  Italy -0.64 5 -0.25 9 -5.01
  Netherlands — — — — —
  Portugal -0.39 2 -0.28 1 -0.58
  Spain -0.46 4 -0.23 4 -1.34
Members of the EU not in EMU
  Denmark -0.48 5 -0.34 1 -1.69
  Greece — — — — —
  Sweden -0.56 4 -0.11 5 -5.61
  United Kingdom -0.53 13 -0.37 1 -2.57
Other countries
  Japan — — — — —
  United States -0.07 6 -0.017 12 -3.27
Sources:  Estimates for the United States are from Cecchetti (1996); those for the remaining countries are from the estimation of Ehrmann’s model in Cecchetti, McConnell, 
and Perez Quiros (1999).
Table 7
SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS, CREDITOR RIGHTS, 













Austria 2 3 10.00 German
Belgium 0 2 10.00 French
Finland 2 1 10.00 Scandinavian
France 2 0 8.98 French
Germany 1 3 9.23 German
Ireland 3 1 7.80 English
Italy 0 2 8.33 French
Netherlands 2 2 10.00 French
Portugal 2 1 8.68 French
Spain 2 2 7.80 French
Members of the EU 
  not in EMU
Denmark 3 3 10.00 Scandinavian
Greece 1 1 6.18 French
Sweden 2 2 10.00 Scandinavian
United Kingdom 4 4 8.57 English
Other countries
Japan 3 2 8.98 German
United States 5 1 10.00 English
Source:  La Porta et al. (1997), Table II.FRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / JULY 1999 21
 Using these data to examine the relationship
between shareholder rights, creditor rights, and enforce-
ment on the one hand, and the concentration of ownership
and the availability of external finance on the other,
La Porta et al. (1997, 1998) come to two conclusions. First,
corporate ownership is more concentrated in countries
where shareholders and creditors are poorly protected by
both the substance of the law and its enforcement. Second,
and more germane to the current discussion, countries
with weaker legal rules and less rigorous law enforce-
ment have smaller and narrower capital markets. Overall,
English common law countries have the least concentration
of corporate ownership and the largest and deepest capital
markets. French civil law countries have the most concen-
trated ownership and the smallest capital markets. La Porta
et al. (1997) conclude that the “differences in the nature
and effectiveness of the financial systems around the world
can be traced, in part, to differences in investor protection
against expropriation by insiders, as reflected by legal
rules and the quality of their enforcement” (p. 1131).
Their findings are confirmed by the data in Table 4, which
show clearly that the United States and the United
Kingdom have much more extensive capital markets than
France and Italy. 
RELATIONSHIP OF THE LEGAL ENVIRONMENT 
TO THE IMPACT OF POLICY
Following the demonstration in La Porta et al. (1997,
1998) that the systematic variation in systems of corporate
governance and finance across countries can be tied to the
differences in the countries’ legal systems, I ask if the varia-
tion in the predicted strength of the lending channel and
the estimated impact of interest rate movements on output
and inflation can be traced to these same legal differ-
ences.19 To address this question, I combine the data from
Table 5 on the predicted strength of the lending channel of
monetary transmission and from Table 6 on the size of the
impact of interest rate movements on output and inflation
with the measures of cross-country differences in legal
organization from Table 7. In Table 8, I report the results
of two straightforward exercises. The first separates the
countries by the origin of their legal system and constructs
group averages for the effectiveness and impact of mone-
tary policy from column 4 of Table 5 and columns 1 and 3
of Table 6 (Table 8, top panel). The results follow the pat-
tern predicted by the index of lending channel effectiveness
as the impact of policy on output and the approximate
sacrifice ratio vary systematically—and as expected—with
the origin of a country’s legal system. 
We can learn a bit more from the data than is
recovered from the simple averages reported in the top
panel of Table 8. The question of greatest interest is
whether the cross-country heterogeneity in the real effects
 
Table 8
TESTING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CROSS-COUNTRY 







 Sacrifice Ratio Legal Family On Output On Inflation
Group Mean
English 1.1 -0.45 -0.21 -3.1
Scandinavian 1.8 -0.52 -0.22 -3.7
French 2.1 -0.70 -0.20 -4.8a
German 2.4 -1.25 -0.49 -5.8
Instrumental Variables Regression
Coefficient — -0.46 0.05 -10.4
Standard error — (0.22) (0.08) (10.4)
Notes:  “Predicted Effectiveness” is drawn from column 4 of Table 5; the “Impact 
of Policy,” from columns 1 and 3 of Table 6. The instrumental variables 
regression is of columns 1 and 3 of Table 6 on column 4 of Table 5, with columns 
1, 2, and 3 of Table 7 as instruments. All of the results in this table use only the 
eleven countries for which there are estimates in Table 6 : Ireland, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States (English common law); Denmark and Sweden 
(Scandinavian common law); Belgium, France, Italy, Portugal, and Spain (French 
civil law); and Germany (German civil law).
aAverage excludes Belgium.
The countries in which the lending channel is 
expected to be strongest have the biggest sacrifice 
ratios and show the largest impact of interest 
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of monetary policy can be explained by differences in the
countries’ financial systems, which have their source in
the strength of shareholder and creditor rights and the
rigor with which these rights are enforced. We can do
this without fully accounting for all of the variation in
the transmission mechanism if we assume that the La Porta
et al. (1997) measures are valid instruments for the financial
variables in a simple regression that has the impact of pol-
icy on the left-hand side and the overall measure of the
lending channel’s effectiveness on the right-hand side. That
is, I assume that the shareholder, creditor, and enforcement
variables are exogenous, while the measure of the effective-
ness of the lending channel may not be. 
The results of these two-stage least squares regres-
sions are reported in the bottom panel of Table 8. Again,
we see that the countries in which the lending channel is
expected to be strongest have the biggest sacrifice ratios
and show the largest impact of interest rate movements on
output. The latter of these relationships has a t-ratio of 2.1,
and so it may even be significantly different from zero. The
results for inflation are much less satisfactory: the measures
of financial structure appear to be uncorrelated with the
impact of policy on prices. Because of the small size of the
sample (eleven countries), the estimates are all fairly impre-
cise, and so I treat them as being only suggestive.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Among the many challenges facing the new Eurosystem is
the possibility that the regions of the euro area will
respond differently to interest rate changes. In this paper, I
have suggested that differences in financial structure are a
proximate cause for these national asymmetries in the
monetary policy transmission mechanism. Moreover, I have
proposed that these differences in financial structure are
likely a result of the EU countries’ diverse legal structures.
The evidence, although circumstantial, is consistent with
this view. Most economists believe that the monetary
transmission mechanism will vary systematically across
countries with differences in the size, concentration, and
health of the banking system, and with differences in the
availability of primary capital market financing. The coun-
tries of the EU differ quite dramatically in all of the
dimensions that would seem to matter, leading to the
prediction that the impact of interest rates on output and
prices will not be consistent across countries. While the
estimates of the impact of interest rate changes on output
and inflation tend to be quite imprecise, they do differ, and
in the way that is predicted by the state of the countries’
financial systems. Finally, we can trace differences in finan-
cial structure, the size and scope of capital markets, and the
availability of alternatives to bank financing to differences
in the countries’ legal structures. 
What does this mean for the future of financial
markets and monetary policy in the euro area? Will the
European banking system become more like that of the
United States? The arguments presented here suggest that
unless legal structures are harmonized across Europe, finan-
cial structures will remain diverse, and so will monetary
transmission mechanisms. It will not be enough to make
regulatory structures more similar, since such a change will
not, in and of itself, alter the structure of capital markets.
In other words, I do not view regulatory competition as a
force to eliminate the asymmetries in the financial inter-
mediation systems of the EU.20 As the European Central
Bank (1999) report makes clear, this force has been very
weak in the past and is expected to be weak in the future.
While we may see cross-border mergers and acquisitions of
financial sector firms that take advantage of the expertise of
those already doing business in a region,21 only a decision
to change the existing legal structures so that shareholders
and creditors in all EU countries enjoy the same rights will
force the movement to a U.S.-style financial structure. APPENDIX FRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / JULY 1999 23
DATA APPENDIX
The data sources for Tables 2-4 in this paper are identified
below.
TABLE 2
Number of institutions and concentration ratios: For
all countries, concentration is calculated as the assets of the
top five banks as a percentage of total bank assets.
Population:  International Monetary Fund, International
Financial Statistics (January 1999), country report tables,
l. 99z, midyear estimates for all countries.
Austria: Austrian National Bank web pages http://
www.oenb.co.at/stat-monatsheft/tabellen/2001p.htm,
Ingesamt, Hauptanstalten, for number of institutions; and
http://www.oenb.co.at/stat-monatsheft/tabellen
2000_5p.htm, Alle Sektoren, Summe Aktiva (Ohne
Rediskonte), for total assets; Austrian National Bank,
Economic Analysis Division, for assets of top five and top
ten banks.
Belgium: OECD, Bank Profitability: Financial Statements of
Banks (1998), country reports on bank balance sheets,
p. 36, l. 37 (under supplementary information), for number
of institutions; Bank of Belgium, Financial and Economic
Statistics Division, for total assets of credit institutions and
for share of top five banks.
Finland: Bank of Finland, Financial Statistics Desk, for all
figures. 
France: Bank of France, Monetary Research and Statistics
Division (DESM-SASM) for all figures on credit institutions.
Germany: Deutsche Bundesbank, Monthly Report (May
1998), p. 16, Table IV.1, column 1, for number of institu-
tions; Deutsche Bundesbank, Department of Controlling,
Accounting and Organisation, Division C-2, for share of
top five banks. 
Ireland: Central Bank of Ireland, Monetary Policy and Statistics,
for number and total assets of all credit institutions (which
include licensed banks, building societies, state-sponsored
financial institutions, and savings banks); IBCA Bank-
Scope database, for assets of top five banks.
Italy: Bank of Italy, Research Department, for all figures. 
Netherlands: OECD, Bank Profitability: Financial Statements
of Banks (1998), country reports on bank balance sheets,
p. 192, l. 37 (under supplementary information), for num-
ber of institutions; De Nederlandsche Bank, Annual Report
(1997), Tables 1, 2.1, and 2.2, for assets of top five banks
and for total assets of monetary institutions.
Portugal: Bank of Portugal web page http://www.
bportugal.pt/publish/frpublish_e.htm, Chart VIII.1 and
Table VIII.2, for number of institutions and share of top
five banks. OECD, Bank Profitability: Financial Statements of
Banks (1998), country reports on bank balance sheets,
p. 231, l. 25, for total assets of commercial banks. 
Spain: OECD, Bank Profitability: Financial Statements of
Banks (1998), country reports on bank balance sheets,
p. 236, l. 37 (under supplementary information), for num-
ber of banks; Bank of Spain, Statistical Bulletin (June 1998),
Tables 61.1 (p. 271), 62.1 (p. 281), 63.1 (p. 291), sum of
column 1 in all tables, for total assets of banks, savings
banks, and credit co-operatives; IBCA Bankscope database,
for assets of top five banks.
Denmark: OECD, Bank Profitability: Financial Statements
of Banks (1998), country reports on bank balance
sheets, p. 64, l. 37 (under supplementary information),
for number of institutions; Denmark National Bank
web page http://www.nationalbanken.dk/nb/nb.nsf/all-
docs/F15D9E8CF275ED1A2412565B4003E8BD5, for
total assets; IBCA BankScope database, for assets of top five
banks. 
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DATA APPENDIX (Continued)
Greece: Hellenic Bank Association, The Greek Banking
System (April 1998), p. 87, for number of institutions, total
assets, and assets of top five banks.
Sweden: Sveriges Riksbank, Statistical Yearbook (1996), p. 17,
Table 6, for number of banks; Sveriges Riksbank, Financial
Statistics Department, for share of top five banks.
United Kingdom: British Bankers Association, Annual
Abstract of Banking Statistics (1997), Table 1.04, for number
of institutions; Bank of England, MFSD, for shares of top
five banks (data relate to all banks and building societies
operating in the United Kingdom and so include the busi-
ness of foreign-owned affiliates in the United Kingdom).
Japan: Bank of Japan, International Department, for all
figures for banks and other deposit-taking institutions, end
of fiscal year 1996 (March 1997).
United States: Federal Financial Institutions Examination
Council (FFIEC), Reports of Condition (call reports data-
base), for all figures for commercial banks.
TABLE 3
Bank data: McCauley and White (1997), Table 1. Federal
Reserve Bank of New York staff calculations for Austria,
Belgium, Greece, Ireland, Italy, and Portugal, based on
ranking of asset size from IBCA BankScope database. In
each country, banks were chosen according to 1997 assets.
Return on assets, loan loss provisions, net interest margin,
and operating cost are drawn from IBCA BankScope
database. 
Thomson ratings: Thomson BankWatch database.
TABLE 4
Number of publicly traded firms and market capitaliza-
tion: International Finance Corporation, Emerging Stock
Markets Factbook (1997), pp. 17 and 23 (also available on
the Wall Street Journal web site http://update.wsj.com/pub-
lic/resources/documents/gi-tab5.htm).
Population: See sources for population data in Table 2.
Privately issued debt: Bank for International Settlements,
International Banking and Financial Market Developments
(February 1998), pp. 46-7, Tables 14 and 15, amount
outstanding, December 1996 figures; sum of figures from
Table 14 (international debt securities) and Table 15
(domestic debt securities).
GDP: International Monetary Fund, International Financial
Statistics (January 1999), country report tables, l.  99b.c for
all countries. Year-average exchange rates used for conver-
sion into U.S. dollars (local currency per U.S. dollar, l. rf
for all countries).
Bank loans: OECD, Bank Profitability: Financial Statements
of Banks (1998), country reports on bank balance sheets,
l. 16 on pp. 27, 35, 63, 67, 91, 115, 143, 159, 163, 167,
191, 231, 235, 251, 259, 263, 303, 307, and 315.
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1. Throughout the paper, I refer to the eleven countries of the
Eurosystem but provide information on only ten. Luxembourg is not
included.
2. See Angeloni and Dedola (1998).
3. Similar points are made by White (1998), who suggests that com-
petition in banking may be about to increase in Europe, stimulated by
the introduction of the euro. In addition, a recent European Central Bank
(1999) study suggests that European Monetary Union may speed up the
process of disintermediation and lead to a more geographically diversified
and internationalized banking system.
4. For example, within the United States, more than 10 percent of firms
with assets exceeding $1 million have chosen to incorporate in Delaware,
a state with less than ½ of 1 percent of the country’s population. Why is
this? The answer can be found by considering how the development of
Delaware’s legal structure has differed from the development of the legal
structure in other states. Originally, large firms were incorporated in
New Jersey because the state, in exchange for incorporation fees and
franchise taxes, had liberalized its corporation law to allow various
mergers and cross-holdings that were disallowed elsewhere. State law also
gave very strong power to corporations’ directors (Grandy 1989).
Delaware copied New Jersey’s statutes and then benefited from changes
made to New Jersey’s law by Governor Woodrow Wilson in 1913. As
this example suggests, the economic structure has its source in the legal
structure.
5. I should note that firms in countries that act slowly will be put at a
competitive disadvantage, and so they might pressure their governments
to speed up the legal changes. The potential strength of such regulatory
competition is an open issue.
6. There is an alternative. A company may move to a country where the
financial system better suits its needs. The La Porta et al. measures,
reported in Table 7, suggest that the United Kingdom is the best
country in the European Community in which to issue both bonds and
stocks, and so firms that wish to have ready access to primary capital
market financing may tend to concentrate there. But for this strategy to
be successful, firms would have to reincorporate and move assets into the
alternative jurisdiction. The assets must move to provide the proper
guarantees to investors. All of this seems unlikely.
7. In addition to the differences in the type of nominal rigidity, there
are variations in the way in which the rigidites are modeled. These
variations are more than formal; they have very different implications for
the dynamic effects of nominal shocks on real variables. Different
modeling strategies are based on differences in the timing of price- or
wage-change decisions. There are three basic schemes used, based on
Fischer (1977), Taylor (1980), and Calvo (1983), and they create very
different dynamic responses of real variables to nominal shocks. Fischer,
for example, assumes prices are predetermined, meaning that at some
time agents set prices for some number of future periods; the level of
prices set on the decision date can differ for the different periods before
the next decision date. In this model, the impact of a nominal shock lasts
for only as long as it takes for all price setters to have a chance to reset
their price schedules. In the Taylor model, prices or wages are assumed
to be fixed, meaning that their nominal value does not vary between
decision dates. When prices or wages are fixed, nominal shocks die out
only asymptotically. In Calvo’s model, price setters change their prices
according to a poison process, leading to a variety of possible dynamics. 
8. Longer run considerations, such as the potential costs or benefits of
modest levels of inflation, critically depend on understanding the sources
of nominal rigidity. For example, Akerlof, Dickens, and Perry (1996) and
Groshen and Schweitzer (1997) consider whether small positive levels of
aggregate inflation can facilitate real adjustments in the presence of an
aversion to nominal wage declines, suggesting that the long-run goal for
inflation might be positive. But Feldstein (1996) contends that the tax
distortions created by inflation reduce the level of output permanently,
an argument that suggests that the optimal level of inflation may even be
negative. Overall, most economists now seem to agree that inflation leads
to lower levels of real output and may even retard long-run growth. See
Feldstein (1999) for a summary.
9. As emphasized by Kashyap and Stein (1994), this assertion applies to
both financial and nonfinancial firms.
10. This is not to say that the traditional mechanisms, operating
through interest rates and exchange rates, are not present as well.
Unfortunately, it has proved to be very difficult to disentangle the
individual importance of the various channels of transmission.
11. It is important to note that there can be significant cyclical and
secular changes in the strength of the lending channel as the health and
concentration of the banking system change, and as capital markets
become deeper and broader.
12. After I collected the data for this section, the European Central Bank
issued its report Possible Effects of EMU on the EU Banking Systems in the
Medium to Long Term. The appendix tables in that report contain much of
the same information presented here.26 FRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / JULY 1999 NOTES
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13. Throughout the analysis, I omit Luxembourg.
14. A significant failing of this analysis is the assumption that these
relative rankings are not changing over time. Surely, if I had chosen
different dates to measure the relative health and concentration of
countries’ banking systems, I would have created a different set of
rankings for the first two indicators. It is entirely possible that both the
relative importance of small banks and the health of the banking system
will become increasingly uniform across countries, leaving only
differences in external finance.
15. See Appendix A in Ehrmann (1998) for additional details. 
16. The results for the United States are derived from Cecchetti (1996).
17. Although he reports estimates for thirteen countries, the estimates
for three of these countries appear to be difficult to interpret. In the case
of Finland, for example, the impact of monetary tightening is to increase
output, not decrease it. For Austria and the Netherlands, we have not
been able to replicate the results in the current version of Ehrmann’s
paper. 
18. Figures 1-13 in Ehrmann (1998) show that the impulse response
functions are rarely significantly different from zero. The same point is
made in Cecchetti (1998) and Cecchetti and Rich (1999).
19. White (1998) makes a related point when he notes that the legal,
tax, regulatory, and supervisory frameworks within which financial
institutions operate differ significantly across the various countries of the
EU. All of these differences make direct competition more complex and
less appealing. He goes on to focus on differences in the EU countries’
labor laws and in the regulatory restrictions the countries place on the
types of financial products that can be offered. These effects are surely
complementary to the ones I address here.
20. It is also extremely unlikely that these difficulties will be overcome
by the issuance of debt and equity in a jurisdiction that offers sufficient
investor protections. But unless firms have assets within these
jurisdictions, I do not see this as a solution.
21. Such developments would be similar to what has happened with the
relaxation of interstate branching regulations in the United States, where
banks in one state have purchased a bank in another state in order to
obtain the legal and regulatory knowledge to do business in that state.
Interstate branching has not meant opening new branches of an existing
bank in another region. REFERENCES
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